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Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

5 March 1953

Chief of Base, Munich

(Attn:

REDSOX/QACTIVE

Transmittal of an agenda prepared as a general survey of the QACTIVE situation.

1. The attached agenda was drawn up in preparation for visit as a general survey of the QACTIVE situation and its current problems. Upon arrival it was learned that sections of the agenda, particularly those on relationships of KUBARK, PRAFFIRM, AECORD, and the German Mission are no longer pertinent. However, has requested that copies be forwarded for HQ information.

2. Only one copy of the agenda is complete with Tab A, the Gulay Problem Chronology, but two additional copies without Tab A are enclosed.

Attachments (3)

Approved:

Distribution:

2-EE w/3 Att.
1-EE w/o Att.
3-CGM w/1 Att.
1-MOB w/o Att.

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25 Feb. 1968

OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AFFECTING DIRECTIVECONTENTS

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APPENDIX:

Gulay Problem Chronology . TAB A

Security Policies and Procedures: DIRECTIVE TAB B

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SECRETUNDERSTANDING PROBLEMS AFFECTING QUACTIVEI. Relationships Between KUBARK, PRATTIRM, CSCB, and ABCNORD**A. KUBARK (QUACTIVE Branch, UK)**

1. KUBARK has apparently not assumed the responsibility for the QUACTIVE project which should properly rest with it:
 - a. KUBARK has permitted Admiral Stevens to fill roles of top policy-maker, controller, adviser, independent emigre negotiator, etc.
 - b. KUBARK has permitted Admiral Stevens to transmit to the field--and has even transmitted to CSCB for Stevens--major policy statements and decisions which seem to contradict previous policy, without KUBARK comment.
 - c. KUBARK has not yet agrees to PRATTIRM the estimates of the local political and administrative situation forwarded by CSCB.
 - d. The above abdication of responsibility has most likely resulted from the lack of sufficient strength and stature in QUACTIVE Branch to command authority over and respect from Admiral Stevens.

EXAMPLES: (1) DIR-3000 passed without comment Stevens' statement to Breher that initial TPLINGO broadcasts are to be limited only by equipment, even though such statement is in direct contradiction to previous KUBARK policy set by the Director (and even contradictory to other PRATTIRM instructions to ABCNORD).

(2) Admiral Stevens' "confidential" paper, The Role of the Soviet Emigration, was forwarded for basic policy guidance of ABCNORD without KUBARK comment to CSCB, even though it amounts to a redefining of the basic mission of the project. (Moreover, the local Consulate doubts if it was cleared with State before release.)

*It was,
of course,
cleared w/State*

(3) CSCB's evaluations, predictions, and recommendations on the entire Ukrainian situation during the past half year have been largely ignored, although they have proved to be generally accurate: (See Gulyay problem Chronology)

- (a) Position of emigre groups re admission of Gulyay group to Center;
- (b) Effects of Dobriansky mission;
- (c) Recommendation last summer that Dabrowski visit to US be expedited.

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2. KUBARK security policy and support for GLA-FIVE require thorough study and systematizing. (This entire subject is being developed in a separate paper.)

B. PRAVFIK (AmComLib, New York)

1. Admiral Stevens' assumption of the role of top policy authority for the project is questionable.

a. Top policy responsibility for the project properly rests with KUBARK (as the responsible agency of the US Government), and the Chairman of AmComLib is only an advisor on and executor of such policy.

b. Normally, the Chairman of an organization such as AmComLib cannot have access to the full range of directives, plans, and information available to KUBARK.

2. Admiral Stevens' assumption of the role of independent negotiator with the emigres is also open to question, especially inasmuch as AmComLib is concerned largely with the emigration in Europe.

a. Admiral Stevens is not fully familiar with field conditions, especially inasmuch as he has not yet visited ANCHORD since assuming command.

b. He and his small staff are heavily influenced by firsthand personal pressure of persons and groups able to reach him with interests which may be entirely different from those of the emigration in Europe.

EXAMPLES: ANCHORD and CSCB cannot evaluate the full extent of such influence because of the lack of information from PRAVFIK, but there is a long history of confusion on both sides of the Atlantic resulting from Niklaevsky's role as self-appointed plenipotentiary of the Center to PRAVFIK, and the Gulay story is replete with examples of the part played by Dekriansky and his partisans as well as Niklaevsky.

c. In assuming this role, Admiral Stevens has failed not only to consult with but even to inform his field representatives who bear the basic responsibility for negotiations.

EXAMPLES: (1) PRAVFIK has never advised ANCHORD of any of its continuing relations with emigre groups in New York. When Swift asked for information about political subsidies granted by PRAVFIK, Stevens told him that it was none of his business.

(2) Complete information on PRAVFIK's briefing

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of Niklaevsky

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of Niclaevsky has never been received. On 1 December Malgounov showed to ANCHORD a letter from Niclaevsky reporting his conversations with PRAFFIRM on Gulay issue. On 6 January ANCHORD was informed of a letter from Niclaevsky to Malgounov reporting his conversation with PRAFFIRM on Point 7, etc., etc. Meanwhile, ANCHORD is left to wonder what is going on.

(3) ANCHORD received no detailed report of the advance briefing given to the Dobriansky mission or of their plan of action. The first Dobriansky utterances in Europe indicated that certain promises had been given them by PRAFFIRM (seemingly confirmed by a clipping from the Washington Evening Star of 12 December received without comment by ANCHORD), but ANCHORD was left in the dark as to what grounds, if any, there were for such statements. Further, ANCHORD has not yet received any report of a debriefing of the Dobriansky mission after its return or of PRAFFIRM's evaluation of its results and plans for future.

(4) ANCHORD was indirectly informed by PRAFFIRM cable of 17 December (for delivery to Malgounov) that Bogatyrychuk would probably accompany Niclaevsky on his trip to Munich for the January plenum. It thus became evident that PRAFFIRM was preparing to introduce a new factor into the Ukrainian situation without informing ANCHORD.

(5) The Gulay Problem Chronology notes additional outstanding examples of failure to coordinate with or advise ANCHORD.

3. PRAFFIRM's administrative support has been unsatisfactory in several respects, especially in the personnel field.

a. Arbitrary remote-control decisions on assignment or reassignment of key personnel have been made by PRAFFIRM without seeking comment from ANCHORD (or GSOB).

EXAMPLE: (1) Admiral Stevens' order last October splitting the radio organization precipitated a crisis which has undoubtedly caused considerable delay in getting on the air and which persists in somewhat quiescent form to this day.

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(2) Initial

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(2) Initial PRAFFIRM announcement indicating Patch relieving Alexander as Senior Political Advisor on arrival might have been even more disastrous.

b. PRAFFIRM has recruited and sent to ANCHORD a number of personnel who (1) were not designated for any particular slot and had no particular qualifications for any existing slot, (2) were not particularly qualified for their slot if they were so designated, or (3) later failed to pass security clearance.

EXAMPLES: Outstanding cases noted under PERSONNEL and SECURITY sections. In addition, there have been continuous complaints by ANCHORD personnel about the quality of secretarial-stenographic employees and about the low calibre of certain other junior personnel.

C. CSOB

1. CSOB sees its own function in the QACTIVE complex as: (a) KUBARK's on-the-spot monitor of the operation, with responsibility for evaluating ANCHORD's activities in themselves and in their relation to the overall situation and providing KUBARK with information and advice derived therefrom, and (b) as a means of security, information, and classified communications support for ANCHORD.

2. However, CSOB's evaluations and advice in accordance with 1(a) above appear to have been generally ignored by KUBARK and PRAFFIRM.

EXAMPLES: The Golay Problem Chronology presents a continuous succession of examples.

3. In spite of the agreement on the above limitation of CSOB's responsibilities reached during the November 1952 conferences in Washington and New York (largely at Swift's insistence), CSOB has been forced to engage in constant consultation with and advisory assistance to ANCHORD on a wide range of matters running from major political problems down to minor administrative details because of:

- ANCHORD's general administrative and political weakness;
- PRAFFIRM's failure to coordinate with and support ANCHORD;
- CSOB's role in delivering security orders (instructions from KUBARK or CSOB rulings based on name check results) which upset the fragile TPLINGO structure at a time when it is under great pressure.

EXAMPLES: The QACTIVE contact reports submitted by CSOB are largely a recitation of examples of 3a-c above.

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4. The frequency of telephone and personal contacts involved in the activities noted in para 3 above increases the danger of security compromise.

EXAMPLE: On 21 February Bement telephoned Dreher referring by number to an Airgram received from PBRAFFIRM dealing with security clearance matters.

5. The complexity of QACTIVE lines of command and responsibilities is further complicated by its relationship to the German Mission. As long as QACTIVE remains a CGOB responsibility and is located within the German Mission area, the Chief of the German Mission will hold the Chief, REDSOX, MOW, accountable for all aspects of the project's activity despite the fact that he can exert no direct control.

D. ANCHORD (AuComLib, Munich)

1. ANCHORD operation has suffered from the two-way direction through the PBRAFFIRM and the CGOB channels and from the interferences and failures on the part of PBRAFFIRM and KUBARK detailed under A and B above.

2. ANCHORD has also suffered markedly from a lack of competent executive and administrative personnel, as detailed under PERSONNEL.

3. As a result of the above factors, ANCHORD's internal administration has been chaotic ever since the arrival of the present Deputy Chairman.

EXAMPLES: (Examples are detailed under PERSONNEL-Swift.)

4. In CGOB's evaluation, ANCHORD's political direction has not been completely effective because of:

a. Lack of sufficient strength on the Political Adviser's Staff;

b. Inability of Deputy Chairman to comprehend problem and to utilize to full advantage the political advisory personnel he has;

c. General and mutual lack of confidence within the ANCHORD shop and between PBRAFFIRM and ANCHORD.

E. Recommendations to improve conditions noted in A-D above.

1. KUBARK

a. It is recommended that KUBARK assert its rightful position as responsible authority and top policy maker for project and that QACTIVE Branch, SR Div., be provided with personnel of sufficient stature to carry out this responsibility.

~~EYES ALONE~~

b. KUBARK

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b. KUBARK should consult with CSOB before directing or agreeing to major policy changes, political moves, or administrative changes directly affecting the field.

c. Detailed recommendations for a realistic security policy are contained under separate cover.

2. PRAFFIRM

a. Admiral Stevens' position should be somewhat modified in accordance with the above.

b. As a matter of general policy, PRAFFIRM should not enter into any negotiations with emigres—such as Nikolaevsky—when it is fully feasible for such emigres to carry on their contact with ANCHORD.

c. When PRAFFIRM decides that special considerations make it desirable to negotiate with emigres in NY, ANCHORD should be fully advised and consulted.

d. PRAFFIRM should likewise consult ANCHORD before making arbitrary changes in assignments of key personnel.

e. The Chairman of AnGomLib—and possibly his senior advisor—should visit the field at least twice a year for first-hand familiarisation.

f. PRAFFIRM should establish a system of regular reports for ANCHORD.

3. CSOB

a. CSOB should continue to attempt to phase itself out to the position noted in para. C1 above as rapidly as is feasible.

4. ANCHORD

a. ANCHORD should reduce its dependence on CSOB as rapidly as possible. To this end it should be bolstered as noted under part IV, Personnel.

b. ANCHORD's performance would be considerably improved if the recommendations noted in para. 2 above for PRAFFIRM are carried out.

II. Political Composition of the Center and Problems of Expansion.

A. OBJECTIVES. A basic conflict exists as to exactly what are the goals of the QACTIVE project:

1. The 1950 Project Outline states the objective in broad terms

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as to "mobilize

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as to "mobilize the emigration into an effective anti-communist political force;

2. During 1952 the primary purpose of the project seemed to be limited to the creation of some sort of valid sponsorship for the radio broadcasts (TELECON 211730Z March 1952);

3. New Admiral Stevens' policy paper indicates a long-term objective of unifying the emigration principally for education in democratic processes.

The conflict resolves itself into whether the concept of the project is to pursue the cold war against the USSR or to prepare on a long-term basis for post-war conditions.

B. STRATEGIC SITUATION.

1. Ethnic Problem. Any attempt to unify the USSR emigration, whatever the objective may be, will run headlong into the nationality question. Cognisance of the problem does not lead to solution, but acceptance of the inevitability of a clash of interests between those groups which put nationalism first and those which put the Russian State first could release energies for more constructive effort. One possible result of the clash of interests may be the evolution of a center of nationalities (Ukrainian, Belorussian, Caucasian, Central Asian) and the concomitant evolution of a Russian State group center which would attract groups which have not joined KTaB, such as NTS. The only force which has prevented such an alignment before this is KTaB itself and the need for a nationality grouping to be assured of US support.

2. Ideological Problem. A second constant obstacle to the expansion of a unified emigration is the struggle for dominance of differing political ideologies. There is no pat solution, but there is the danger that a marked imbalance could wreck all unification efforts. The only solution is by constant watchfulness and complete objectivity in management to maintain balance by effecting groups of strong leftist leanings with groups of equally strong rightist leanings and to work toward strengthening the position of middle groups.

3. Course of Action. In order to exert a positive shaping influence in the organisation of emigre groups for concerted action and not to permit the emigres to organise independently through our default, it is imperative that serious study of the possible alternative courses of action open to us be undertaken immediately and that a decision, based upon the aims to be achieved, be reached in the nearest future. The following principal alternatives are presented:

- Continue to support and develop the present Coordinating Center, recognising that although it is still far from the broadly

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representative organization which is desired and may yet collapse under the strain of the ethnic conflict of interests, it is presently capable of supporting to a limited extent immediate psychological and political warfare against the communist regime, and can be broadened gradually and carefully to provide the desired unifying influence in the emigration.

b. Creation of a center composed of carefully-selected outstanding individuals, with the emphasis on immediate psychological warfare and little concern for unification.

c. Replacing the present Center by a broader, looser assembly which would attempt to include all but the most objectionable elements of the emigration, with primary emphasis on unification and little on effectiveness of such an organization in present psychological warfare.

d. Creation of an organization consisting of one Russian State center and one nationality center, coordinated by a supra committee, with primary emphasis on immediate psychological warfare effort but at risk of maintaining and deepening a dangerous split.

e. Creation of an organization consisting of several nationality groupings (i.e., Russian, Ukrainian, Caucasian, Central Asian, Belorussian) coordinated firmly by an American Committee and loosely by an emigre coordinating center, with the expectation that the latter would assume more control as it grows in strength and stature. This would provide for both immediate effectiveness through American coordination and for long-range unification through emigre structure, while at the same time avoiding the dangerous ethnic split.

CGOS estimates, and the Political Advisor, Mr. Kelley, and Meares, Thayer and Kendrick of the Consulate concur, that the prospects for success of Course (a) are still sufficiently promising to warrant full support. If and when it becomes apparent that Course (a) cannot or will not succeed, CGOS (and Meares, Thayer and Kendrick) recommend the adoption of a course such as outlined in Course (e) as offering the greatest promise of achieving positive results in the way of both present psychological warfare effort and the long-range unification of the emigration.

C. TACTICAL PROBLEMS

1. The major political problem now facing QACTIVE is that of the admission of Ukrainian groups at the 30 April plenum. Inasmuch as the action taken at that time will deeply affect all elements of the entire emigration, it is imperative that full consideration be given to all aspects of the problem and that a firm policy be adopted well in advance of the plenum.

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2. All seem to

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2. All seem to agree that it is most desirable to admit the widest possible representation from the Ukrainian emigration at that time. The optimum at present would be the following four groups:

a. The Ukrainian Liberation Movement (Gulay). This group is already considered accepted by resolution of last plenum, and Agounib is trying to work it into a bloc under Bogatyrychuk's leadership for entry.

b. Ukrainian Federalists (Bogatyrychuk). Also accepted by last plenum.

c. Ukrainian Armenian Party (SKHU) (Dolenske). Has agreed to principle of entering together with Federalist-Gulay group and will undoubtedly be accepted if it applies. Only question is whether Dolenske can win sufficient support from membership in time.

d. Some sort of a working front composed of representatives of the nationalist groups which are not prepared to affiliate themselves physically at present. Although we are not yet able to predict such possibilities, it could result from the present activities of the Temporary Working Committee set up in Munich at the time of Dobriansky's visit, or from the subsequent efforts of Dobriansky himself with other groups. If such a front were to subscribe to the present statute, there is no doubt that it would be accepted. If it would be satisfied with such a minor change in the statute as the reference to means of determining future relationship to Russian State, it is believed likely that the present Center would make such an accommodation. The Center will never agree to prior recognition of independence, but there is reasonable doubt that the Ukrainians will hold out for this along. It is presently believed most likely, however, that the entry of such a front will be blocked by their insistence on purity, or one vote for each nationality, including Russian. It is certain that the Russians will never agree to such representation, although they might be agreeable to some sort of a compromise in place of the present system, such as, perhaps, on a basis proportional to the population within the current USSR.

3. If the way cannot be cleared for the entrance of a nationality grouping such as described in 2d above by 30 April but the other three groups (Dolenske, Bogatyrychuk, and Gulay) are admitted at that time, it is believed that the effect on the emigration at large will be generally favorable, even though there would probably still be unfavorable criticism in some nationalist circles. The eventual entrance of groups with more pronounced nationalist leanings should not be hindered or retarded under such circumstances.

4. If Dolenske is not able to win the necessary support to bring his group into the Center by 30 April and the Bogatyrychuk-Gulay groups

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are admitted, there will be sharp negative reaction in all nationalist circles, including the other minorities as well as the Ukrainians. The eventual entrance of such groups will probably be retarded. Dolemsk, however, has affirmed that the prior entrance of Bogatyrychuk-Gulay will not deter him. If Dolemsk and any other moderate nationalist groups were subsequently to enter, it is likely that other more strongly nationalist elements will gradually respond to the continued attraction of financial support and the "band-wagon" effect.

5. If Dolemsk does not come in by 30 April and AmComLib tries to force the Center again to defer the admission of Bogatyrychuk-Gulay in order to wait for a nationalist grouping, it is estimated that the Russian State bloc will attempt to take the course of action it threatened during the last plenum; i.e., withdraw from the present Center, announce continued adherence to the statute of the present Center, and invite KTS, KDV, Gulay, Bogatyrychuk, Tatar-Bashkir, Kalmyk, and all other groups of similar sentiments to join them in forming a new center, which will then present AmComLib with a fait accompli.

6. In reviewing the situation, CSCB strongly recommends AmComLib support of whichever of the alternatives described in paras. 2-4 appears to be most likely of acceptance, with decreasing preference in the order listed. Under no circumstances would CSCB concur with AmComLib support of the 5th alternative, which would mean de facto wrecking of all that the present Center represents.

III. RADIO

A. On the air date: Still set as 1 March 1953.

B. Language: Russian and as many minorities as are ready--probably only Armenian and possibly Azerbaijanian initially, with announcement that others will follow as soon as desks are fully staffed and ready.

C. Territory: Soviet occupation forces in zones.

1. To assist RNSCAP program;

2. Because it will be relatively far easier to measure audience reaction among the occupation forces than among population within USSR;

3. Not because programs directed to occupation forces are any easier to prepare;

4. Not because present equipment can only reach zones.

D. Content: Russian broadcast will be essentially a balanced, general program suitable for broadcast inside, but with the addition of certain

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special features

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special features and the slanting of other general items for special appeal to the occupation forces. Ulianov's paper furnishes acceptable basis for development of general program policy.

E. Monitoring: CGOB will receive and audition tapes of all Russian broadcasts, at least during initial months. CGOB's comments will be passed to Manning Williams.

F. Administration: At this moment, it is still doubtful whether the present organization—resulting from Stevens' "green-light for Williams to meet March deadline" order—will stabilize sufficiently to permit continued operation. By the middle or latter part of March, this should be clearly evident. If it fails, the radio will urgently need a good, experienced radio executive to put it together, and it would help greatly if the man also had some sort of background in this type of operation. (There would be no point in recruiting such a man, however, if he would have to go through the normal period of processing, because the operation will most likely be either fully stabilized or defunct after four to six months.)

G. Emigre Central: In connection with the above, it is still considered to be of utmost importance that the radio move in the direction of emigre independence and self-sufficiency as rapidly and fully as justified by the capability of the emigres in key positions. (As noted elsewhere, the major difficulty in the present administrative problem has resulted from M. Williams' extreme determination to protect the radio from what he considers to be unsympathetic American interference.)

IV. Personnel Problems

A. AECORD. From its outside position, CGOB is naturally unable to give complete evaluations of the personnel in AECORD, but on the basis of such contact as CGOB has and reports which it receives, it appears that AECORD has suffered generally from a lack of competent key personnel qualified for the requirements of the operation, and especially from the lack of good executives.

EXAMPLES: (1) Swift is considered generally incompetent.
(See separate paper.)

(2) Bement is a sound business manager, but not a strong executive.

(3) Randolph is exceptionally weak as an executive.

(4) Stock is forceful but apparently not very well qualified professionally and with a strong tendency to dominate which alienates colleagues and subordinates.

(5) Williams is excellent in understanding of mission, but not dynamic and a poor administrator.

(6) Alexander is an excellent negotiator, but not dynamic, and to a certain extent a victim of his own

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Great Russian background.

B. PEAFFIRW apparently needs a first-class executive to provide better logistical support to AECHORD.

C. KUBARK, as noted previously, has lacked personnel of sufficient stature to exert influence over and command of Admiral Stevens.

D. CSCB is staffed adequately for monitoring and support, but not for helping to run AECHORD or giving policy direction to it.

V. Location

A. Transmitters: The problem of the permanent location of the full-scale transmitters has been talked about since last year. Inasmuch as construction work will probably take the rest of a year, it is extremely important that an early decision be made, yet [] was ordered to desist from further explorations this field last September and, as far as CSCB or AECHORD knows, nothing further has been done.

B. Center: The problem of the future location of the Center is not as pressing in itself as that of the transmitters, but it is so closely related to the latter that the two decisions should probably be made simultaneously. All indications indicate that Paris or vicinity will be the most desirable location for the Center, while it may be decided that the transmitters should be south of the Pyrenees.

VI. AECHORD Public Relations

No attempt has been made to ascertain German public opinion on the AECHORD operation, but from every local source which deals directly or indirectly with Munich emigre affairs come reports discrediting the project. The criticism is on several different scores, but the chief points of attack are profligacy and insecurity.

A. Spending. There is little defense against the charges of "profligacy", "waste of the taxpayers' dollar", "inordinate spending", "empire building", "over-generous subsidization", etc., as long as AECHORD has nothing to show for the money that has gone into the project. The attempt to cut down expenses by firing a percentage of employees only increased the volume of "inside stories of spending" released to the public since apparently no precautions were taken to prevent open airing of views. Beyond question, there is still unnecessary spending on a scale unwarranted by AECHORD's activities. Should a cost-conscious investigation, even on the part of the President's Committee for Psychological Action, appear in Munich, AECHORD will probably die a quicker death than if the Gulay group is refused membership.

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EXAMPLES: (1) Although an attempt is being made currently to reduce living costs, many ACHORD US personnel are still living, with their families, in Munich's most expensive hotels with costs as high as \$930 a month. As an example of what can be done to reduce these costs, Ronalds was moved in January to an apartment, reducing his living cost charged to ACHORD from \$880 to \$125 a month.

(2) Although TPLINGO salary schedules are in line with those of RFE and VOA, the persons occupying slots in some cases have been previously employed in other radio activities at a much lower salary rate, i.e., a radio technician boasts he is earning \$4000 a year more at ACHORD than he formerly earned at RFE.

(3) Editors of publications subsidized by ACHORD are frequently rumored to have apparently unlimited funds at their disposal; i.e., Kunta, editor of Sabotay Kavas, entertains lavishly at local bars and remarks, "God gives, we drink."

B. Security. The security and character of KTAAB and TPLINGO emigre personnel are subject to constant criticism from outside the operation. Here again the position is indefensible. Insecure, immoral, venal, and politically corrupt personnel have been accepted for appointment, partly due to pressure to get a representative Center established and partly due to pressure to get a radio on the air. The situation is dangerous. Crisis follows crisis, and sooner or later one of these may develop into a major blow-up which could expose US government connections and have consequences reaching beyond ACHORD into other US operations.

EXAMPLES: (1) The abdicating of Kanatbay with Center funds brought to light an example of a person with background and character known to be questionable being put in a position of trust.

(2) Fatalibeyli, an Azerbaijani with a long reputation for loose, immoral living, is a writer-editor on the Azerbaijan desk at TPLINGO.

EYES ALONE

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